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FEDERAL MULTIPLE OFFENSE PROSECUTIONS:
THE SAME EVIDENCE TEST AND
CUMULATIVE PUNISHMENT
It is well established that Congress can so define punishable offenses
that several can be committed in the course of a single criminal trans-
action.'- Thus an accused may be convicted and punished cumulatively
for both entering with intent to rob and the robbery itself,2 or for
both selling and possessing the same contraband goods' even though
the possession was in contemplation of the sale. In each case a single
course of conduct can be found to violate more than one statutory pro-
hibition. In such cases cumulative punishment may be authorized by
one of four possible statutory combinations: (1) by separate clauses
of the same section of a statute4 or of the criminal code,5 (2) by
separate sections of the same statute6 or chapter of the code,7 (3) by
separate chapters of the code," or (4) by separate statutes or by the
code and a statute outside it.1°
Federal prosecutors who fear losing convictions because of insuf-
ficiency or failure of the evidence,:" or who wish to tailor punishments
1. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932); Albrecht v. United
States, 273 U.S. 1 (1927) ; Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911).
2. E.g., Hensley v. United States, 156 F.2d 675 (8th Cir. 1946), and cases cited
in note 25 infra.
3. Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1 (1927).
4. E.g., Slade v. United States 85 F.2d 786 (10th Cir. 1936) (endeavoring to
and obstructing the administration of justice).
5. The various criminal statutes were codified and re-enacted into positive law
effective Sept. 1, 1948. 18 U.S.C. (1958).
6. E.g., Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) (sale of narcotics
not in original package and sale of narcotics without written order); Roark v.
United States, 17 F.2d 570 (8th Cir. 1927) (persuading women to be transported,
and transporting women for immoral purposes).
7. E.g., McGann v. United States, 261 F.2d 956 (4th Cir. 1958) (robbing a bank
and robbing on federal lands).
8. E.g., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954) (mail fraud and transport-
ing stolen property); Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (conspiracy
and the substantive offense).
9. E.g., Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911) (drunken conduct and
insulting an officer).
10. E.g., Rayborn v. United States, 234 F.2d 368 (6th Cir. 1956) (transporting
stolen property and Internal Revenue Code).
11. See Roark v. United States, 17 F.2d 570, 573 (8th Cir. 1927); Huffman v.
United States, 259 Fed. 35 (8th Cir. 1919); Kirchheimer, The Act, The Offense,
and Double Jeopardy, 58 Yale L.J. 513, 525-26 (1949).
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to fit particular criminals,' often take advantage of this statutory
complexity by prosecuting every possible offense, either by charging
several offenses as separate counts of a single indictment 13 or by
bringing separate indictments which will be tried together.14 A fre-
quent result is that the accused is convicted of more than one offense
and is punished cumulatively. Historically, defendants have objected
to such cumulative sentencing on the grounds of double jeopardy, 5
but such pleas have been almost completely ineffective in the federal
courts because of the application of the "same evidence test." This
test, in view of its usual result, could better be termed "the different
evidence test," for it holds that unless the same evidence is needed to
prove both offenses they are not the same in law or fact. 6 The pur-
pose of this note is, first, to inquire to what extent a double jeopardy
limitation may be possible despite the same evidence test and to sug-
gest a second limitation upon cumulative sentencing besides double
jeopardy. In addition, the note will proffer a conceptual system for
analyzing multiple count indictment cases. Scope of the treatment
will be limited to those federal cases in which multiple offenses are
prosecuted together in a single trial. Most of the discussion will per-
tain to the cases involving one of the first two situations mentioned
above where the same statute or code chapter defines all the offenses
in question.
The same evidence test as used in the multiple count indictment
cases was originally devised for use where two offenses were tried
separately. The test in such situations was utilized to resolve the issue
of double jeopardy raised in the second trial. Either upon failure of
12. See Horack, The Multiple Consequences of a Single Criminal Act, 21 Minn.
L. Rev. 805, 820 (1931); Note, Identity of Offenses: A Study in Judicial Method,
45 Harv. L. Rev. 535, 541 (1932).
13. Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a) provides: "Two or more offenses may be charged in
the same indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the
offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or
similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more
acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme
or plan."
14. Fed. R. Crim. P. 13 provides: "The court may order two or more indict-
ments or informations or both to be tried together if the offenses, and the de-
fendants if there is more than one, could have been joined in a single indictment
or information. The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution were under
such single indictment or information."
15. U.S. Const. amend. V, "nor shall any person be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . .. ."
16. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932); Morgan v. Devine,
237 U.S. 632 (1915); Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911); Burton v.
United St4tes, 202 U.S. 344 (1906) ; Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365 (1902);
Hans Nielsen, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 176 (1889).
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conviction in the first prosecution, or upon discovery of additional
evidence, an offense related to that of the former prosecution could
be tried if the same evidence test showed any difference between the
offenses. 17 Thus, in the landmark case of The King v. Vandercomb &
Abbott,' a prosecution for breaking and entering with intent to steal
was allowed to follow a prosecution for breaking, entering, and steal-
ing which had failed because the element of stealing had not been
proved. Because the element of stealing did not have to be proved in
the second indictment, the two indictments were held to be sufficiently
different to avoid the double jeopardy ban. Moreover, the "same evi-
dence" was held to mean the evidence required under the respective
indictments, not the evidence actually offered at the two trials. With
the advent of complex statutory crimes and the modern provisions
for joinder of offenses in one indictment' came the multiple offense
prosecution as we know it today. A single criminal transaction could
be in violation of several statutory clauses or sections, and each of-
fense could be charged in a separate count of an indictment and made
separately punishable. To override the defense of double jeopardy
the same evidence test was carried over from the two-trial situation
on the theory that counts could be equated to indictments. Apparently,
however, this transfer was made without the courts taking cognizance
of a crucial difference regarding the double jeopardy issue in the two-
trial and one-trial situations. In the two-trial situation the issue is
harassment-whether the defendant can twice be submitted to the
rigors of trial for the same offense. In the one-trial situation the issue
is punishment-whether the defendant can twice be punished for the
same criminal transaction.2 0 Thus the test originally designed to per-
mit a second trial has been used to permit cumulative punishment, and
furthermore, has been used as the criterion for decision almost to
exclusion of the more important test of statutory interpretation, i.e.,
whether Congress intended such a result when it enacted the par-
ticular statute.
Before inquiring into the rationale of the same evidence test to
show specifically how it restricts the double jeopardy limitation on
cumulative punishment, it would be well to examine the basis for the
17. For contemporary application of this principle see, e.g., Gavieres v. United
States, supra note 16; Burton v. United States, supra note 16; District of Columbia
v. Buckley, 128 F.2d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Singleton v. United States, 294 Fed. 890
(5th Cir. 1923); Ex parte Rhinelander, 11 F. Supp. 298 (W.D. Tex. 1935).
18. 2 Leach 708, 168 Eng. Rep. 455 (1796).
19. See statutes cited in notes 13 and 14 supra.
20. This distinction has been referred to in terms of the procedural and sub-
stantive aspects of double jeopardy. Note, Statutory Implementation of Double
Jeopardy Clauses: New Life for a Moribund Constitutional Guarantee, 65 Yale
L.J. 339, 340-41 (1956).
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plea of double jeopardy in the one-trial, as opposed to the two-trial
situation. In the 1873 case of Ex Parte Lange,2 1 the Supreme Court
held that the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution applied to
double punishment as well as to double trial. In that case there had
been a double punishment for a single offense; a statute had provided
a punishment of fine or imprisonment, and the trial court had imposed
both a fine and imprisonment. Since the fine had already been paid,
the court vacated the prison sentence. More recently the Supreme
Court has held--' that where the second punishment was imposed be-
cause of the mistaken supposition that Congress had defined two of-
fenses instead of one there is no double jeopardy but only an errone-
ous sentencing. The distinction between the two holdings relates to
whether the second punishment is for the same offense or for a sup-
posed second one. This distinction is somewhat technical, but as a
practical matter the grounds upon which the second sentence is
vacated are of no consequence. 3 It should be noted that in both
situations the only federal agency charged with imposing double
jeopardy was the court, not Congress, and in the multiple offense
case it was held that the court, even in imposing a wrongful second
sentence, had not technically violated the double jeopardy clause.
Thus in a case where Congress may have authorized a court to punish
each offense charged in a multiple count indictment, the determination
that Congress has violated the double jeopardy clause should be pre-
ceded by three preliminary questions to be answered in the affirmative.
(1) Do the statutes define separate offenses?
(2) If so, did Congress intend that punishment for these offenses
be cumulative instead of alternative?
(3) If so, are the offenses so identical that part of the same offense
will be twice punished?
A fourth question is whether or not there is a double jeopardy
limitation on Congress' power to provide for cumulative punishment.
From this order of inquiry emerge two possible limitations to protect
criminal defendants from the imposition of cumulative punishment.
The first lies in construction of the statutes as providing only for
alternative punishments. This limitation should be a possibility in all
multiple offense prosecutions. The second possible limitation is the
restriction placed on Congress by the double jeopardy clause. Because
21. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873). The Lange case was reaffirmed in Benz v.
United States, 282 U.S. 304 (1931), and In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943).
22. Holiday v. Johnson, 313 U.S. 342, 349 (1941). Accord, White v. Pescor,
155 F.2d 902 (8th Cir. 1946), rev'd on other grounds.
23. An erroneous sentence is as subject to collateral attack as an imposition of
double jeopardy. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958).
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continued application of the same evidence rule appears probable, this
limitation will be available, if at all, in only a few cases.
How the same evidence test has been used to restrict the double
jeopardy defense can be best understood by reviewing the more im-
portant multiple offense prosecution cases in the context of five factual
categories suggested by the test itself. In each category the largely
overlooked, but distinctly possible, limitation of statutory interpreta-
tion will be discussed.
I. CASES IN WHICH No ELEMENT OF ONE OFFENSE
Is NEEDED TO PROVE THE OTHER.
In this situation one criminal transaction can be broken into two
parts which do not overlap. The two offenses are chronologically sepa-
rate. Here the same evidence test is used as a logical device for
demonstrating this severability. The most notable example is the case
of breaking and entering with intent to steal, which is a completed
offense, and the subsequent larceny, which also is a completed offense.
Graphic illustration of the way in which use of the same evidence test
has led to consideration of only the double jeopardy limitation in this
type of case is furnished by the recent decisions of the Supreme Court
dealing with the Federal Bank Robbery Act of May 8, 1934.24 For a
number of years the lower federal courts had generally held that
entering a federally insured bank with intent to commit robbery was
an offense apart from the completed robbery and that the bank rob-
ber therefore could be punished separately for each offense.2 The
courts reasoned that since proof of the completed robbery required
evidence other than that which was needed to prove entry with intent
to commit robbery, the two offenses were separate.28 In other words,
the courts used the same evidence test to decide that since each offense
was defined by the statute, both could be punished at the same time.
It can scarcely be maintained that the courts, in taking this position,
were engaging in statutory interpretation to discover the intention
of Congress. Because of dissension among circuits,27 the issue of
whether there should be one punishment or two finally came before
the Supreme Court in Prince v. United States28 in 1957. The Court
did not even consider the same evidence test in deciding that although
24. 48 Stat. 783 (1934), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1958).
25. Rawls v. United States, 162 F.2d 798 (10th Cir. 1947); Audett v. United
States, 132 F.2d 528 (8th Cir. 1942) ; Wells v. United States, 124 F.2d 334 (5th
Cir. 1941) ; Durrett v. United States, 107 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1939).
26. See especially Rawls v. United States, supra note 25; Durrett v. United
States, supra note 25.
27. Simunov v. United States, 162 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1947).
28. 352 U.S. 322 (1957).
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two offenses were defined only a single punishment was intended. The
Court considered only the statute and found in its legislative history
that the offense of entry with intent to rob had been added by amend-
ment in 1937 with the purpose of closing a loophole left when the com-
pleted offense of robbery could not be proved. The Court found no
congressional intention to pyramid punishments, and refused to give
the statute other than a narrow construction.2 9 Implicit in this hold-
ing is the conclusion that the vision of the lower courts had been
obstructed by the same evidence test, which looks only to the double
jeopardy issue to the exclusion of any other possible limitation upon
cumulative punishment. The same evidence test may be useful in
delineating the various offenses which can be carved from a single
criminal transaction, but it is of no help in discerning whether Con-
gress intended cumulative punishment.
In fairness it must be admitted that before the Prince case the
lower courts did have previous Supreme Court authority for their
results. In the 1915 case of Morgan v. Devine30 the Supreme Court
had decided that forcibly entering a post office with intent to steal
and thereafter consummating the larceny were offenses which could
be punished cumulatively3' In comparing the statutory interpretation
of the Morgan ease with that of the Prince case a basic difference in
approach is to be noted.2- In the Morgan case the Court found an
29. Two years after the decision in the Prince case, the Court, in Heflin v.
United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959), used the same reasoning and method to decide
that robbing a bank and receiving the stolen money were not cumulatively punish-
able under the Bank Robbery Act. The Court held that the pertinent section of the
act "was not designed to increase the punishment for him who robs a bank but
only to provide punishment for those who receive the loot from the robber." Id.
at 419.
30. 237 U.S. 632 (1915).
31. As a matter of fact the first federal ease dealing with multiple offense in-
dictments had been with regard to this very issue. In 1880, a circuit court had
decided in the case of Ex parte Peters, 12 Fed. 461 (8th Cir. 1880), that the
entering and the larceny could be punished cumulatively. The basis for this hold-
ing was the apprehension by the judge that the common law allowed punishment
for both burglary and larceny at the election of the prosecutor not to seek punish-
ment on only one offense. The appellate courts were not faced with this issue
again until the case of Halligan v. Wayne, 179 Fed. 112 (9th Cir. 1910), by which
time the Peters case still provided the only federal authority. The court in Hal-
ligan v. Wayne held contrary to the Peters ease which it felt was based on a
misapprehension of the common law. The Peters case was similarly rejected in
Munson v. McClaughry, 198 Fed. 72 (8th Cir. 1912) and O'Brien v. McClaughry,
209 Fed. 816 (8th Cir. 1913). In accord with the Peters case was Anderson v.
Moyer, 193 Fed. 499 (N.D. Ga. 1912). In Morgan v. Devine, the Supreme Court
in effect adopted the argument of the Peters ease and bolstered it with the same
evidence test and statutory interpretation.
32. It is submitted that the real difference between the cases is in this method.
In the Prince case the Court did, in a footnote, distinguish the cases by adverting
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1960/iss1/10
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intention by Congress to create the separate offenses of entering and
larceny. From this finding the Court apparently assumed that both
offenses were to be punished cumulatively, basing this assumption on
common law33 rather than on congressional intention. In the Prince
case the Court was not in doubt about the intent of Congress to define
two separate offenses, and extended their consideration to whether
Congress had intended cumulative punishment. It is submitted that
the intention of Congress regarding the question of punishment must
be specifically considered and the statute strictly construed if penal
statutes are not to receive an unduly broad application."4
II. CASES IN WHICH No ELEMENT OF ONE OFFENSE IS NEEDED IN
PROVING THE OTHER ONLY IF THE FACTS ARE TA9EN HYpo-
THETICALLY AND NOT AS THEY ACTUALLY HAPPENED.
The rationale for permitting cumulative punishment under cases of
the first category is that the two offenses can be considered as two
segments of the same transaction having no overlap with each other.
The segments are chronologically separate, and each is defined by
statute as an offense. In cases of the second category there is no such
chronological severability since the evidence of one offense will auto-
matically prove the other. Therefore some other kind of severability
must be found to save the case from falling under category IV, infra,
to the fact that the statute in Morgan v. Devine spoke of forcible entry while the
Bank Robbery Act was violated by merely walking through an open door with
the intent to steal. 352 U.S. 322, 328 n. 9. The significance of this distinction was
not articulated. Cf. Clark v. United States, 267 F.2d 99, 101 (4th Cir. 1959).
33. See note 31 supra.
34. Another noteworthy example of the type of case includible in this category,
but one which involves separate chapters of the code, is when defendant is in-
dicted for both conspiracy and the substantive crime which was the object thereof.
It has been firmly settled that the conspiracy chapter calls for cumulative punish-
ment if the conspiracy is chronologically separate from the completed crime.
Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). Nor is there double jeopardy
in this. Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365 (1902).
For other cases of this category in which two offenses have been held cumula-
tively punishable see, e.g., United States v. Kafes, 214 F.2d 887 (3d Cir.
1954) (failing to file income tax return and attempting to evade); Gargano v.
United States, 140 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1944) (transporting and concealing mor-
phine) ; Chrysler v. Zerbst, 81 F.2d 975 (10th Cir. 1936) (transporting and re-
ceiving a stolen car) ; Reid v. Aderhold, 65 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1933) (forging and
uttering a check); Silverman v. United States, 59 F.2d 636 (1st Cir. 1932) (selling
and receiving morphine); Parmagini v. United States, 42 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1930)
(selling morphine and concealing smuggled morphine); Gorsuch v. United States,
34 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1929) (receiving and transporting liquor); Roark v. United
States, 17 F.2d 570 (8th Cir. 1927) (persuading women to be transported and
transporting women for immoral purposes); Hilt v. United States, 12 F.2d 504
(5th Cir. 1926) (possession and transportation of liquor).
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where the result may be a finding of double jeopardy. It has already
been noted that in the early case of The King v. Vandercomb &
Abbott,, ' where there were successive trials for both breaking and
entering and stealing and for breaking and entering, that in distin-
guishing the two offenses as separate the court held the forms of the
two indictments controlling, no matter what had actually been proved
at the second trial. The same concept has been carried over into the
multiple offense prosecution, along with the application of the same
evidence rule,- and it has an especially severe application in cases of
category II. The basic case is Albrecht v. United States37 where the
Supreme Court was faced with the contention that punishment for
illegal sale and illegal possession of the same liquor under the National
Prohibition Act was double punishment and therefore violated the
fifth amendment double jeopardy clause. The argument was based
on the actual fact that the liquor which defendants had sold was the
same as that on which the possession count was based, and that the
evidence of the sale was the same as that which proved possession.
The Court held that selling and possession were distinct offenses be-
cause, despite what had actually happened, one might sell and cause
to be delivered something he has never possessed and one might
possess without selling. The hypothetical severability rendered the
offenses separate for purposes of prosecution.38
In seeking rational grounds for the decision in the Albrecht case,
the fact situation must be clearly isolated from that of the first cate-
gory. If the possession had lasted for a long period of time before the
defendant had decided to sell, the case would have been clearly in-
cludible under category I, supra. What makes the second category
distinguishable is that the only proof of possession actually offered is
35. See note 18 supra and text supported thereby.
36. In United States v. Kafes, 214 F.2d 887 (3d Cir. 1954) defendant objected
that although failure to file an income tax return need not have been proved as
part of the case under the second count of income tax evasion, it had in fact been
so proved. The court replied, that "The short answer . . . is that the [same
evidence] rule itself, as quoted above, sanctions the use of one act as part of the
proof of both offenses." Id. at 891.
37. 273 U.S. 1 (1927).
38. This rule of hypothetical severability was directly challenged in Michener v.
United States, 157 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1946). In that case defendant had been
convicted of forcing an engraver to make counterfeit plates for printing money
and of having been in constructive possession of the plates at the same time. The
court held that sentences on both counts constituted erroneous double punishment
because the evidence of one offense did actually prove the other. The Supreme
Court reversed, per curiam, 331 U.S. 789 (1947), citing the Albrecht case. The
case may be rationalized on the grounds that one can cause counterfeit plates to
be made without being in possession (constructive or otherwise) of them. But cf.
Carney v. United States, 163 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1947).
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part of the same evidence used to prove the sale. If the same evi-
dence rule is to be prevented from discovering that the second punish-
ment is double punishment, some way must be found to make the
offenses appear to be separate and without fatal overlap. This severa-
bility is found by use of a hypothesis which gives Congress every
benefit of the doubt. The hypothesis is that Congress intended to make
the sale of goods already in possession a more serious offense than
the sale of goods not in possession. Since there need be no possession
for sale, the hypothesis is that Congress intended the prohibition of
sale to refer only to the least definition of sale and did not contemplate
a sale coupled with possession. It is submitted that this hypothesis
really amounts to an application of the principle that a statute will
be given such a construction as to avoid if at all possible the result
of unconstitutionality.-9 The constitutional challenge is raised by the
same evidence test which is, historically, a test for double jeopardy.
But if, in the first place, the more familiar rule of construction-that
penal statutes will be construed strictly against the state-were ap-
plied, the result might be that no cumulative punishment was ever
intended and therefore no constitutional question would ever be raised.
Once it has been raised, the courts fail to consider what has been done
by Congress and look only to what Congress can do. Once the same
evidence test has been brought into court, the courts apparently be-
come blinded to all but the constitutional considerations. Properly
conceived, the same evidence test is no more than a convenient rule
of thumb-a logical method-for pointing out the identity of offenses.
When it is applied to the evidence actually offered at trial it can be
a means for demonstrating the improbability that Congress meant for
cumulative punishment to apply to these second category situations
where there is not even chronological severability as in category 1.40
It is much more probable that Congress intended in such cases that
the one offense be punished only if the more serious offense could not be
proved.41 If, however, there is reason for deciding in favor of cumu-
39. See Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288 (1936); Crowell v. Benson, 285
U.S. 22 (1932).
40. No less authority than Judge Learned Hand of the Second Circuit has
argued that Congress never intended in defining distinct crimes of this sort to
make them more than alternatively punishable. United States v. Chiarella, 187
F.2d 12, 13 (2d Cir. 1951), rev'd per curiam, 341 U.S. 946 (1951). The grounds
for the reversal are not clear.
41. In Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959), the Supreme Court over-
ruled several decisions by the circuit courts of appeal to the effect that robbing
and receiving could be punished cumulatively under the Bank Robbery Act. See,
e.g., Martin v. United States, 256 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1958). As in the Prince
case the Court was aided by "meager" legislative history which indicated that the
prohibition against receiving was added merely to cover the earlier omission.
Therefore the section "was not designed to increase the punishment for him who
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lative punishment despite the improbability of such congressional
intention, the test can then be applied hypothetically to show how the
cumulative punishment is not double punishment.42
III. CASES IN WHICH BOTH OFFENSES HAVE A COMMON
ELEMENT, BUT EACH REQUIRES PROOF OF SEPARATE
ELEMENTS NOT NEEDED FOR THE OTHER.
In category I, severability of offenses was chronological and in
category II severability was hypothetical. In category III severability
is either by virtue of separate statutory regulations concerning a
particular act4 ' or is on the basis of separate physical objects to which
the statute pertains. Moreover, in the first two applications of the
same evidence test the basic inquiry of the statutory interpretation
limitation was whether Congress intended alternative or cumulative
punishments. In the third category there is no question of punish-
ments being alternative; rather the question is whether Congress
meant to define separate punishments at all, i. e., did Congress intend
to define a crime in terms of a course of conduct or in terms of a
series of cumulatively punishable offenses? If the latter, there will
be as many punishments as there are offenses proved. Finally, in the
first two categories any cumulation amounted to only two sentences;
in this third category cumulation can amount to several sentences.
This last aspect apparently has induced the courts to look much more
to the question of punishment than in the previous cases. A good
illustration of what is involved is found in cases dealing with the
White Slave Traffic Act (Mann Act) , 4 when more than one woman
is illegally transported across a state line at the same time. The
First" and Eighth Circuits,6 relying on the same evidence test to
demonstrate severability, held that the transportation of each woman
was a separate offense even though all were transported at the same
robs a bank but only to provide punishment for those who receive the loot from
the robber. We find no purpose of Congress to pyramid penalties for lesser offenses
following the robbery." 358 U.S. at 419. But cf. State v. Gumbs, 246 F.2d 441
(2d Cir. 1957) and Aaronson v. United States, 175 F.2d 41 (4th Cir. 1949). In
both cases defendant was sentenced cumulatively for stealing and receiving.
42. Other cases to be considered in this category are McGann v. United States,
261 F.2d 956 (4th Cir. 1958) (robbing a bank and robbing on federal lands);
Mathis v. United States, 200 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1952) (punishment both for trans-
porting and possessing held improper); Simkoff v. Mulligan, 67 F.2d 321 (2d Cir.
1933) (possession and uttering of a counterfeit bill).
43. E.g., Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) (selling drugs not
in original stamped package and selling drugs without a written order).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1958).
45. Crespo v. United States, 151 F.2d 44 (1st Cir. 1945).
46. Gillenwaters v. Biddle, 18 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1927).
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time. Although the common element of transportation was required
for proof of each offense, the same evidence test showed no possible
double jeopardy because the transportation of each woman could be
proved independently. The fact that a different woman was involved
in each count made each count a distinct offense separately punish-
able. Finally, in the 1955 case of Bell v. United States 47 the Supreme
Court upheld the view of the Tenth Circuit 48 in deciding that the
common element of transportation was the gist of the offense defined
by Congress. In so holding, the Court expressed no doubt that Con-
gress could punish on the basis of the number of women transported,
but held as it did because it found the statute ambiguous and therefore
resolved to construe it strictly as a penal statute.
The Mann Act cases illustrate the problems found in statutes which
use the word "any" as the common adjective in describing the object
against which the offense is committed. The Mann Act speaks of "any
woman or girl, '49 and this finally was interpreted not to indicate the
number of offenses defined. The same has been held concerning "any
of the aforesaid drugs"50 and the theft of "any mail matter."5' 1 But
in the 1915 case of Ebelling v. Morgan, 2 the Supreme Court held that
a defendant could be convicted and sentenced cumulatively for cutting
several different mailbags during the same course of conduct where
the statute read, "whoever shall cut, tear, or otherwise injure any
mail bag, pouch, or other thing." And a recent case held that more
than one offense was punishable in a situation in which a stolen truck
contained several interstate shipments to different customers, the
statute reading "any interstate shipment. 15 3 There is also an un-
resolved disagreement among the circuits with regard to whether the
wording of the Federal Bank Robbery Act, "assaults any person, or
puts in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous
weapon" can support as many punishments as there were lives put in
jeopardy.54 It is submitted that there is nothing objectionable in the
existence of such apparently inconsistent results, if the distinction can
be based upon statutory interpretation. The word "any" can assume
greater or lesser importance depending upon its use by Congress in
different contexts. Its ambiguity can best be resolved by the basic
47. 349 U.S. 81 (1955).
48. Robinson v. United States, 143 F.2d 276 (10th Cir. 1944).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1958).
50. Braden v. United States, 270 Fed. 441 (8th Cir. 1920).
51. Colson v. Johnson, 35 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Cal. 1940); Colson v. Aderhold,
5 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. Ga. 1933).
52. 237 U.S. 625 (1915).
53. Oddo v. United States, 171 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1949).
54. Lockhart v. United States, 136 F.2d 122 (6th Cir. 1943); McDonald v.
Hudspeth, 129 F.2d 196 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 665 (1942).
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canons of statutory interpretation, such as looking to the evil sought
to be remedied, and, as a last resort, the maxim that penal statutes
will be construed strictly against the state. It is important to notice
that in the cases in the third category, unlike the cases in the two fore-
going categories, the courts apparently have more often realized that
the same evidence test only begs the question of congressional inten-
tion and leads to cumulative punishment. In cases of this type the
courts have often decided against such punishment55
IV. CASES IN WHICH THE PROOF OF ONE OFFENSE NECESSARILY
INCLUDES ALL THE ELEMENTS OF ANOTHER, BUT ADDS
ITS OWN SPECIAL ELEMENT TO THEM.
For purposes of analysis the cases of this category can be divided
into three general types:
a) Cases in which the greater and the lesser statutory offenses are
defined in terms of common law crimes, thus making analogous
the doctrine of the lesser included offense. Examples are indict-
ments which charge both robbery and assault or robbery and
larceny, or which charge both the crime and the attempt.
b) Cases in which a crime is made a lesser included offense by the
establishment of a greater punishment for a particular appli-
cation of it. An example is where the indictment charges both
robbery and robbery by use of a dangerous weapon.
c ) Cases similar to those found in main category II, except that
no hypothetical severability is possible. An example is an
indictment which charges both manufacture and possession
of contraband goods.
In the three main categories of cases previously discussed the only
limitation available to a defendant was strict construction against
cumulative punishment. In the cases of the fourth category there is
also a possibility of the additional limitation of double jeopardy. In
the previous categories the double jeopardy argument has not had a
firm basis because of the severability of offenses under the same evi-
dence test. In this category the same evidence test does not show
severability of offenses but rather a partial overlap or identity. As
will be shown in the following discussion, however, the double jeopardy
limitation has not been firmly established by the cases.
55. For other cases of this category see, e.g., United States v. Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218 (1952) ; United States v. Adams, 281 U.S. 202 (1930) ;
Flemister v. United States, 207 U.S. 372 (1907); Caballero v. Hudspeth, 114 F.2d
545 (10th Cir. 1940) ; Reger v. Hudspeth, 103 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1939) ; Becker v.
United States, 91 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1937); Bracey v. Zerbst, 93 F.2d 8 (10th
Cir. 1937) ; United States ex rel. Bracey v. Hill, 77 F.2d 970 (3d Cir. 1935).
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Only one case favorable to defendant rests flatly on grounds of
double jeopardy. In the 1945 case of Rutowski v. United States,0
defendant had been charged with both robbing a postal clerk and
carrying away postal property. The court held that sentencing on
both counts had been a violation of the double jeopardy clause because
the charge of asportation was essentially a charge of larceny, and
that larceny is included in every robbery. Therefore, to the extent
of the lesser crime, defendant had been punished twice for the same
offense. The Rutowski case seems to be directly contrary to the earlier
case of Schultz v. Biddle5 7 in which a court had upheld cumulative
punishment for assault with intent to rob and robbery by use of a
dangerous weapon. In contrast to the clear logic of the Rutowski case
it is difficult to discover from the opinion a logical basis for the
Schultz case. One difference between the cases was that in the Schultz
case the count charging the lesser crime came first, while in the
Rutowski case the greater crime was charged first. There is language
in each opinion which on first reading seems to make this distinction
controlling by virtue of that version of the same evidence test which
was designed for the two-trial situation. Unless the second count
required the same evidence as was needed to prove the first count
there was no double jeopardy. But it is difficult to conceive that either
court could have so misapplied the same evidence test, especially in
view of the fact that each court quoted the correct version of the test
for multiple offense prosecutions elsewhere in its opinion. That such
an unimportant distinction as the order of the counts should make
any difference is hard to believe. The more probable reason for the
Schultz decision is that the case was not clearly of type (a) above,
but had mixed elements of both type (a) and type (b). The charge
was not merely assault and robbery but assault and robbery by use
of a dangerous weapon. Therefore the decision may rest on the idea
that there were somehow two assaults, one with and one without a
dangerous weapon. By this view one assault could be punished sepa-
rately and one could be punished as part of the robbery. Since it
seems improbable that a robbery would involve more than one assault,
and since the courts have never gone so far as to make offenses sepa-
rately punishable by breaking one offense down into time segments,,8
the Schultz case remains confusing and is probably a wrong decision. 0
56. 149 F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1945).
57. 19 F.2d 478 (8th Cir. 1927).
58. Hans Nielsen, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 176 (1889); In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274
(1887).
59. The decision in Schultz v. Biddle should be read in conjunction with the later
decision of Schultz v. Zerbst, 73 F.2d 668 (10th Cir. 1934). Costner v. United
States, 139 F.2d 429 (4th Cir. 1943), reaches exactly the opposite conclusion of
the Schultz cases in exactly the same kind of situation, but the court based its
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Nevertheless, the Schultz case was followed in the case of Slade v.
United States,60 in which there was cumulative punishment for ob-
structing and impeding the administration of justice and also for en-
deavoring to do so. The Slade case adopts the seemingly improper use
of the same evidence test of the Schultz case, and demonstrates the
tendency of the courts to allow conviction and punishment for a vio-
lation of every "or" clause in a statute, without regard to either the
possibility that "or" may really mean "or even," or to the possibility
that the double jeopardy clause may have been violated.
In the cases of type (b) above, the question of cumulative punish-
ment has thus far been decided in favor of the defendants on the basis
of the statutory interpretation limitation. In such cases the double
jeopardy limitation has not been reached. With regard to the robbery
of both banks and post offices it has been decided that Congress in-
tended robbery with a dangerous weapon to be only a more serious
degree of robbery and therefore only alternatively punishable.". The
same principle has been applied when the lesser crime is assault
instead of robbery2
In cases of type (c) the courts have based their denial of cumu-
lative punishment squarely upon a proper application of the same
evidence test. In a notable series of cases decided under the National
Prohibition Act, the majority of courts held that conviction for manu-
facturing liquor necessarily included the offenses of possession of the
liquor and possession of equipment for manufacturing liquor. 3 Each
possession was made punishable by the statute, but when the ultimate
act of manufacturing was proved punishment of possession could be
decision on the statutory interpretation limitation and therefore never reached
the question of a double jeopardy limitation. In still another identical case a
district court seemed to base a deoision in favor of defendant upon double jeopardy
grounds but did not use that exact term. Colson v. Johnston, 35 F. Supp. 317
(N.D. Cal. 1940). In view of these cases it is probable that the Schultz case is no
longer the law on its own facts. But cf. Hensley v. United States, 156 F.2d 675
(8th Cir. 1946), in which the indictment broke up the robbery into separate ele-
ments of larceny and assault.
60. 85 F.2d 786 (10th Cir. 1936). It is noteworthy, however, that the fines for
the lesser offenses were for the nominal amount of one dollar.
61. With regard to the Bank Robbery Act, a host of cases have followed the
decisions in Hewitt v. United States, 110 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1940), and Durrett v.
United States, 107 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1939). With regard to the Postal Service
Statute, see Costner v. United States, 139 F.2d 429 (4th Cir. 1943), and Colson v.
Johnston, 35 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Cal. 1940).
62. Costner v. United States, supra note 61.
63. Goetz v. United States, 39 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1930); Tritico v. United
States, 4 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1925); Morgan v. United States, 294 Fed. 82 (4th
Cir. 1923); Reynolds v. United States, 280 Fed. 1 (6th Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 282 Fed. 256 (6th Cir. 1922). Contra, Gracie v. United States, 15 F.2d
644 (1st Cir. 1926).
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only alternative. Possession did not prove manufacture, but manu-
facture did prove possession. However, in none of these cases did the
courts indicate whether the consequences of this finding by the same
evidence test were based on the double jeopardy limitation or merely
upon the improbability of any Congressional intention to punish
cumulatively.
The conclusion to be drawn from all three types of cases in this
category concerning the possibility that a doubly jeopardy limitation
upon Congress exists is that no such limitation has yet been estab-
lished. Although in view of the firm holding of the Rutowski case it
is probable that such limitation will be established, there are some
grounds for believing that it may not. One is the possibility that the
growing recognition of the statutory interpretation limitation will
obviate any necessity of a second limitation. Another is the fact
that when faced with cases of this kind trial courts will often exercise
their discretionary power to make sentences concurrent. 4 There may,
however, be cases, especially when the two statutory offenses are not
defined in the same statute, 5 when the courts will be reluctant to
construe strictly against cumulative punishment or to sentence con-
currently. Even then there is still the possibility that the courts may
decide that the double jeopardy clause, although it prevents Congress
from punishing the same offense as many times as it wants, does not
prevent Congress from punishing as much as it wants when all of-
fenses are tried together.66 It must not be forgotten that although the
case of Ex Parte Lange decided that the double jeopardy clause
applied to double punishment as well as double trial, the facts of that
case were that a court had imposed a second punishment without
authority from Congress.6 7 To the question of whether Congress has
authority to impose double punishment only one Court of Appeals has
given an answer.
64. E.g., McGann v. United States, 261 F.2d 956 (4th Cir. 1958) (robbing a
bank and robbing on federal lands); Evans v. United States, 232 F.2d 379 (D.C.
Cir. 1956) (larceny and unauthorized use of a vehicle).
65. See Catrino v. United States, 176 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1949), in which the
two counts were endeavoring to obstruct justice and subornation of perjury.
Each offense is defined under a separate chapter of the present criminal code,
18 U.S.C. (1958). Catrino was acquitted on the first count, but had he been con-
victed the court would have been confronted with a situation in which a holding
of strict construction against cumulative punishment would have been difficult
but in which the same evidence test would clearly show that there was double
punishment.
66. This would, in effect, be a holding that double jeopardy has no substantive
side where separate offenses are defined. See note 20 supra, and text supported
thereby. See also Calvaresi v. United States, 216 F.2d 891, 902 (10th Cir. 1954)
(dictum).
67. See text supported by note 21 supra.
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V. CASES IN WHICH BOTH OFFENSES REQUIRE IDENTICAL EVIDENCE.
These are the cases for which the same evidence test purports to
be searching. The evidence required to prove one offense automatically
proves the other offense and vice versa. Such cases are not common;
they occur only when one count is substantially only a verbal variation
of another count.68 The verbal variations are usually different phrases
in the same statute, and the question which courts must answer is
whether the different statutory phrases have more than mere ex-
emplary significance.6 This question is really no more than whether
Congress has in fact defined separate offenses or has merely said the
same thing twice and in two different ways. The way to determine
whether Congress has said the same thing twice is to ask what are
the essential elements of each offense charged and whether the same
evidence satisfies both." If the same evidence test shows identity, the
conclusion most readily available is that Congress did not intend to
make the same offense twice punishable. If an opposite conclusion is
reached, the possibility of a double jeopardy limitation would be pre-
cisely the same as in category IV.71
In summary, it is concluded that the same evidence test, when it is
properly used, provides the federal courts with a convenient and
logical tool for demonstrating the distinctions between the separate
offenses involved in a course of criminal conduct. Such severability
68. "We have repeatedly protested against the practice when the counts are
merely verbal variants of a single criminal transaction." Hand, J., in United
States v. Chiarella, 184 F.2d 903, 911 (2d Cir. 1950). Even conspiracy is con-
sidered only a verbal variation in certain cases where there is no ingredient of
conspiracy not present in the completed crime. Pinkerton v. United States, 328
U.S. 640, 643 (1946); Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 121-22 (1932);
United States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354, 355-56 (1926).
69. In Stevens v. McClaughry, 207 Fed. 18 (8th Cir. 1913), the statute spoke
in one place of taking mail and in another place of taking, opening, and em-
bezzling the contents. The court held that where the same mail was involved in
each count there was no substantial difference in offenses.
70. In United States v. Noble, 155 F.2d 315 (3d Cir. 1946), the court, in
dictum, decided that several violations of ration orders were really only one
offense. In Barnes v. United States, 142 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1944), the court held
that shipping adulterated food under a guaranty and misbranding of food were
a single offense under the Pure Food and Drug Act.
71. See cases cited note 70 supra. In the Noble case the court spoke in terms
of double jeopardy, but the whole subject was dictum. In the Barnes case there
was no mention of double jeopardy but only interpretation of the statute.
Another case to be considered under this category is Carter v. McClaughry,
183 U.S. 365, 394-95 (1901) in which a court martial punished an officer for both
fraud and conduct unbecoming an officer, the latter conduct being the same as the
former. The Supreme Court held that this was not double jeopardy. The case de-
serves special consideration as a court martial, not an ordinary criminal pro-
ceeding.
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is an effective counter to the plea of double jeopardy. But the courts
can be criticized for over-reliance on the same evidence test because
they have let it divert them away from the problems of statutory
interpretation inherent in multiple offense prosecutions. This appears
to have been partly because of the idea that the only issue was
double jeopardy, and partly because the statutes do define crimes and
set punishment without covering the possibility of cumulation. The
statutes are often clear, as far as they go. The problem is what
criteria the courts are to use in filling the gaps left by the failure of
Congress to specify whether punishment should be cumulative. It is
submitted that this gap should be filled by a reasonable presumption
against cumulative punishment. There is no reason why Congress
should be presumed to have intended every definition of an offense to
require an additional sentence when the real purpose was probably to
cover an additional possibility. The burden of establishing any such
intention should be on the prosecution, not the defendant. In most
cases the general duty of the courts to construe penal statutes strictly
should provide a remedy for injustice without resort to the double
jeopardy clause of the constitution. That clause can at best be used
only in a limited number of cases anyway, and it is possible that it
has no application in multiple offense cases at all. But whether the
question is the propriety of cumulative punishment or the existence
of a double jeopardy limitation, the courts should not dodge the issues
by imposing concurrent sentences. To do so is a kind of judicial
hedging which does not clarify the law. The courts should in all
cases give the statutes a thorough examination and interpretation,
and should justify their conclusions with more than mere invocation
of the principle that Congress has the power to make each step of a
criminal transaction a separate offense.
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